The absence of good (Latin: privatio boni), also known as the privation theory of evil,[1] is a theological and philosophical doctrine that evil, unlike good, is insubstantial, so that thinking of it as an entity is misleading. Instead, evil is rather the absence, or lack ("privation"), of good.[2][3][4] This also means that everything that exists is good, insofar as it exists;[5][6] and is also sometimes stated as that evil ought to be regarded as nothing,[7] or as something non-existent.[8][9][10]
It is often associated with a version of the problem of evil: if some things in the world were to be admitted to be evil, this could be taken to reflect badly on the creator of the world, who would then be difficult to admit to be completely good.[1][6][11] The merit of the doctrine in serving as a response to this version of the problem of evil is disputed.[1][12]
^ abcCalder, Todd (2020), "The Concept of Evil", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-09-11
^Aquinas, Thomas (1990). Peter Kreeft (ed.). A Summa of the Summa. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. ISBN0898703174.
^Menssen, Sandra; Thomas D Sullivan (2007). The Agnostic Inquirer. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub. p. 136. ISBN978-0802803948.
^Teichman, Jenny; Katherine C Evans (1999). Philosophy : A Beginners Guide. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. p. 45. ISBN063121321X.
^Boethius (1999). The consolation of philosophy. Watts, V. E. (Victor Ernest) (Rev. ed.). London: Penguin Books. ISBN978-0-14-192037-5. OCLC773581629.
^Rorem, Paul. (1993). Pseudo-Dionysius : a commentary on the texts and an introduction to their influence. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 148. ISBN1-4237-6478-1. OCLC65213301.