Collateral censorship

Collateral censorship is a type of censorship where the fear of legal liability is used to incentivize a private party who is acting as an intermediary to censor the speech of another private party.[1][2][3] Examples of intermediaries include publishers, journalists, and online service providers.[3] Regardless of the merits of the speech in question, holding intermediaries liable may induce them to censor a large amount of additional speech in an attempt to avoid liability.[4] Also, an intermediary is likely to be more willing to censor than the original speaker would be, since it is not as invested in promoting the speech in question.[3][5]

Collateral censorship is a justification for laws which limit the liability of intermediaries, in order to avoid the suppression of lawful speech.[5] According to Christina Mulligan of Brooklyn Law School, "Unless intermediaries are granted near-complete immunity, the government will be able to censor authors collaterally by threatening to punish intermediaries for authors’ speech, forcing intermediaries to restrain what the government cannot directly."[3] It has been suggested that online intermediaries are particularly vulnerable to chilling effects from collateral censorship.[1]

  1. ^ a b "Washington Post v. McManus: Fourth Circuit Invalidates Maryland's Online Campaign Advertising Disclosure Law". Harvard Law Review. 134: 1575–82. 10 February 2021. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
  2. ^ Sadeghi, S. (28 June 2016). "Election Speech and Collateral Censorship at the Slightest Whiff of Legal Trouble". UCLA Law Review. 63. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
  3. ^ a b c d Mulligan, C.M. (2013). "Technological Intermediaries and Freedom of the Press". SMU Law Review. 66 (1). Retrieved 17 May 2021.
  4. ^ Hartstein, D.E. (2006). "Collateral Censorship and First Amendment theory". University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law. 8 (3): 765–812. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
  5. ^ a b Wu, F.T. (2013). "Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity". Notre Dame Law Review. 87 (1): 293. Retrieved 17 May 2021.

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