Back نشاطات الاستخبارات الداخلية في أفغانستان Arabic په افغانستان کې د آی اس آی فعالیتونه Pashto/Pushto 三軍情報局在阿富汗的活動 Chinese
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| Inter-Services Intelligence activities in Afghanistan | |
|---|---|
| Part of Soviet–Afghan War, Operation Cyclone, War in Afghanistan (1989–2001) and War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) | |
 | |
| Operational scope | Strategic and tactical |
| Location | |
| Date | 1975–present |
Pakistan's principal intelligence and covert action agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has historically conducted a number of clandestine operations in its western neighbor, Afghanistan. ISI's covert support to militant jihadist insurgent groups in Afghanistan, the Pashtun-dominated former Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Kashmir has earned it a wide reputation as the primary progenitor (at times either intentionally or unintentionally) of many active South Asian jihadist groups.
With the first publicly-known ISI operation in Afghanistan occurring in 1975,[1] in response to a limited border conflict between the two nations,[2][3][4] ISI's operations in Afghanistan grew exponentially in response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with backing from Saudi Arabia and the United States' Operation Cyclone.[5] Mujahideen groups fighting the communist Afghan government and its later defenders, the Soviet Union, were funded, trained, and equipped by ISI and successfully forced both the politically embarrassing withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Soviet-backed communist government of Afghanistan. Despite this achievement, the previously-allied, ISI-supported mujahideen groups began to compete for power, initiating three successive civil wars (1989–1992, 1992–1996, and 1996–2001). When ISI's preferred mujahideen group to take power in Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, showed little promise of seizing Kabul and lost popular support though a bloody and relentless shelling of the city, ISI sought a new group to establish an Afghan government friendly to Pakistan's interests.
After the Taliban movement demonstrated it could clear routes for Pakistani land trade in the capture of Spin Boldak through Kandahar City in 1994, the ISI dropped support for Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami and shifted its focus to the Taliban. Through ISI, Pakistan armed, equipped, and supplied young fighters to the movement from jihadist Deobandi religious schools (madrassas) in the relatively-ungoverned Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. ISI continued to support the Taliban through its 1996 capture of Kabul and declaration of the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. From 1996 to late 2001, Pakistan backed the Taliban in its war against the allied remaining mujahideen groups in the country's north, united under the banner of the Northern Alliance (United Front), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud.
After the September 11th attacks in the United States by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, hosted by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 1996, Pakistan publicly declared its policy of support to the United States in their war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and their Taliban hosts. Despite the public pledge of support, Pakistan was widely believed by both international observers and the subsequent Afghan government alike to maintain their backing of Taliban and, in the view of some, al-Qaeda.
Pakistan's motivations for covert activities in Afghanistan, since the cessation of hostilities between the two nations in the mid-1970s, have largely focused on supporting (Hezb-i Islami, Taliban) or opposing (PDPA, Soviet, Northern Alliance) various groups in an attempt to dictate the Afghan government in Kabul. This program to seat and preserve an Afghan government friendly to Pakistani (and intrinsically anti-Indian) interests has largely centered on support to groups ideologically aligned with Islamabad, typically Pashtun, socially conservative, political Islamist, and Deobandi (Sunni).
- ^ Kiessling, Hein (2016). Unity, Faith and Discipline: The Inter-Service Intelligence of Pakistan. Oxford University Press.
The era of ISI action in Afghanistan now began. A first large scale operation in 1975 was encouragement of large scale rebellion in the Panjshir valley.
- ^ Tomsen, Peter (2013). The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflict and the Failure of Great Powers. Hachette UK.
In 1960, Daoud sent Afghan troops disguised as tribesmen into Pakistan's Bajaur tribal agency north west of Peshawar. The intrusion into the area where durrand line was not very well defined, was driven back by local Bajaur Pashtun tribe who opposed any interference in their affair from Afghanistan or Pakistan. In 1961, Daoud organized larger, more determined Afghan incursion into Bajaur. This time Pakistan employed American supplied F-86 Sabres jets against Afghans, inflicting heavy casualties on Afghan army unit and tribesmen from Konar accompanying them. To Daoud's embarrassment, several Afghan regular captured inside Pakistan were paraded before the international media.
- ^ Houèrou, Fabienne La (2014). Humanitarian Crisis and International Relations 1959-2013. Bentham Science Publisher. p. 150.
The president Khan revived adversarial stance not only toward Pakistan, but to the sponsor, USSR. First Daoud Khan set off proxy war in Pakistan, but in retaliation faced growing Islamic fundamentalists movement within Afghanistan
- ^ Newton, Michael (2014). Famous Assassination in World History:An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 106.
By 1976, while proxy guerilla war with Pakistan, Daoud faced rising Islamic fundamentalists movement led by exiled cleric aided openly by Pakistani prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
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