Back Радыкальная партыя Алега Ляшко BE-X-OLD Radikální strana Oleha Ljaška Czech Radikale Partei Oleh Ljaschkos German Partido Radical de Oleh Lyashko Spanish Oleh Ljaškon radikaalipuolue Finnish Parti radical d'Oleh Liachko French Partito Radicale di Oleh Ljaško Italian 올레흐 랴슈코의 급진당 Korean Oleha Ļaško Radikālā partija Latvian/Lettish Partia Radykalna Ołeha Laszki Polish

Radical Party of Oleh Liashko

For the party that was called the Ukrainian Radical Party and founded in October 1890, see Ukrainian Radical Party.
Radical Party of Oleh Liashko
Радикальна партія Олега Ляшка
AbbreviationRPL[1]
LeaderOleh Liashko[2]
Founded28 September 2010; 14 years ago (2010-09-28)[2]
HeadquartersKyiv
Ideology
Political positionRight-wing to far-right[B]
Colours  White[8]
  Black[8]
  Red[8]
Verkhovna Rada[9]
0 / 450
Regions[10]
582 / 43,122
Website
liashko.ua
^ A: The party's economic policies are considered left-wing.[11]
^ B: The Radical Party has been widely described as right-wing[12] and far-right.[13] It has also been described as left-wing.[14]

The Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (Ukrainian: Радикальна партія Олега Ляшка, romanized: Radykal'na partiia Oleha Liashka; RPL),[1][2] formerly known as the Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party (Ukrainian: Українська демократично-радикальна партія), is a political party in Ukraine.[15] It was registered in September 2010.[2] It was primarily known for its radical populism, especially in 2014, when it had its largest amount of support.[16]

At the 2012 parliamentary election, the party had won 1 seat.[17] The party won 22 seats at the 2014 parliamentary election.[18][19] At the 2019 parliamentary election it lost all of its seats.[20]

  1. ^ a b Rybachok, Denys (2019). "Values, programmes and actions: examining the ideologies and legislative positions of Ukrainian political parties". EECMD Publications. 4. Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy (EECMD): 60–61.
  2. ^ a b c d Політична партія «Радикальна Партія Олега Ляшка» [Political party «Radical Party of Oleh Liashko»] (in Ukrainian). DATA. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  3. ^ Rybachok, Denys (2019). "Values, programmes and actions: examining the ideologies and legislative positions of Ukrainian political parties". EECMD Publications. 4. Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy (EECMD): 60. The party is a supporter of social democracy with high social obligations of the state (in particular, in the medical care).
  4. ^
  5. ^
  6. ^ "The political landscape is shifting in Ukraine". 29 August 2014. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
  7. ^ de Borja Lasheras, Francisco (22 December 2016). "Ukraine's rising Euroscepticism". European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  8. ^ a b c Rudenko, Anna (2017). "Features of Technologies of Party Products Visualization in Ukraine (by example of 2012 and 2014 election campaigns)". European Political and Law Discourse. 4 (2). National Institute for Strategic Studies: 163.
  9. ^ "Депутатські фракції і групи VII скликання" (in Ukrainian). "Deputy fractions and Groups". Verkhovna Rada official website.
  10. ^ Кандидати, яких обрано депутатами рад. www.cvk.gov.ua (in Ukrainian). 24 January 2020. Retrieved 24 January 2020.
  11. ^
  12. ^
    • Zeitzoff, Thomas (2023). Nasty Politics: The Logic of Insults, Threats, and Incitement. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 27. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197679494.001.0001. ISBN 9780197679500. Right-wing nationalist and populist politician Oleh Lyashko is famous for using aggressive and crude language towards his political opponents.
    • Kjerulf Dubrow, Joshua; Palaguta, Nika (2016). Towards Electoral Control in Central and Eastern Europe. IFiS PAN Publishers. ISBN 978-83-7683-123-7. A (+) sign was attributed to those parties that insist on a state grounded in national principle: Those are VO "Svoboda", "Pravyy Sector", the "Samopomich" Union, Oleg Lyashko's Radical party and Nasha Ukraina. All of them, except for Nasha Ukraina, are recognized as right wing or right wing populist parties.
    • van der Laarse, R. (2016). Who Owns the Crimean Past?: Conflicted Heritage and Ukrainian Identities. GentProvincie Oost-Vlaanderen. ISBN 978-90-74311-89-2. Not least because of the successful adaptation of the nationalist agenda by other Maidan parties, the ultranationalist right is represented in parliament after October 2014 only by Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party (Verchoyna Rada) which received 7.5 percent of the vote.
    • Engel, Valery; Ljujic, Vanja; Bortnik, Ruslan; Castriota, Anna; Pranvera, Tika; Charny, Semen; Camus, Jean-Yves; Peunova, Marina; Dr. Stratievsky, Dmitry; Allchorn, William; Molas, Barbara; Charne, Semyon; Lubarda, Balša; Tarasov, Ilya (August 2023). Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in The OSCE Area 2020-2022. civicnation.org: European Center of Democracy Development. This is mainly explained by the fact that part of the nationalist electorate voted for other right-wing parties - "European Solidarity", Oleg Lyashko's Radical Party, "Golos", which widely used nationalist and anti-Russian rhetoric during the election campaign.
    • Pleines, Heiko (2021-04-01). "The framing of IMF and World Bank in political reform debates: The role of political orientation and policy fields in the cases of Russia and Ukraine". Global Social Policy. 21 (1): 34–50. doi:10.1177/1468018120929773. ISSN 1468-0181. The Communist Party lost its parliamentary representation in 2014, while a right-wing populist party was represented since 2012 (first 'Svoboda', later the 'Radical Party').
    • Engel, Valery; Ljujic, Vanja; Bortnik, Ruslan; Castriota, Anna; Pranvera, Tika; Charny, Semen; Camus, Jean-Yves; Peunova, Marina; Dr. Stratievsky, Dmitry; Allchorn, William; Molas, Barbara; Charne, Semyon; Lubarda, Balša; Tarasov, Ilya (August 2023). Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in The OSCE Area 2020-2022. civicnation.org: European Center of Democracy Development. This is mainly explained by the fact that part of the nationalist electorate voted for other right-wing parties - "European Solidarity", Oleg Lyashko's Radical Party, "Golos", which widely used nationalist and anti-Russian rhetoric during the election campaign.
    • Kjerulf Dubrow, Joshua; Palaguta, Nika (2016). Towards Electoral Control in Central and Eastern Europe. IFiS PAN Publishers. ISBN 978-83-7683-123-7. A (+) sign was attributed to those parties that insist on a state grounded in national principle: Those are VO "Svoboda", "Pravyy Sector", the "Samopomich" Union, Oleg Lyashko's Radical party and Nasha Ukraina. All of them, except for Nasha Ukraina, are recognized as right wing or right wing populist parties.
    • van der Laarse, R. (2016). Who Owns the Crimean Past?: Conflicted Heritage and Ukrainian Identities. GentProvincie Oost-Vlaanderen. ISBN 978-90-74311-89-2. Not least because of the successful adaptation of the nationalist agenda by other Maidan parties, the ultranationalist right is represented in parliament after October 2014 only by Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party (Verchoyna Rada) which received 7.5 percent of the vote.
  13. ^
    • Risch, William Jay (2015). "What the Far Right Does Not Tell Us about the Maidan". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 16 (1): 137–144. doi:10.1353/kri.2015.0011. ISSN 1538-5000. Results from presidential and parliamentary elections this year only further demonstrated the marginal support the Far Right has had in the Revolution of Dignity. In the presidential elections of 25 May, Svoboda's Oleh Tiahnybok scored a mere 1.16 percent, Right Sector's Dmytro Yarosh only 0.07 percent, and the Radical Party's Oleh Liashko just 8.32 percent of the vote. Altogether, the leaders of Ukraine's Far Right won no more than 10 percent of the vote.10 Parties of the Far Right did not do well against other parties in the parliamentary elections of 26 October. While the Radical Party polled as much as 7.44 percent of the vote, it was far behind more centrist parties like the People's Front led by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk (22.14 percent); the Petro Poroshenko Bloc led by the country's current president (21.82 percent); Self-Help, led by L´viv's liberal mayor Andriy Sadovyi (10.97 percent); and the Opposition Bloc, made up mostly of the remnants of Yanukovych's Party of Regions (9.42 percent).
    • Примуш, М. В.; Перебейнос О., Ю. (2015). "Специфіка формування ідеології українських політичних партій на сучасному етапі їх розвитку" [Specifics of the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian political parties at the current stage of their development]. Вісник Національного університету «Юридична академія України імені Ярослава Мудрого». Serie: Філософія, філософія права, політологія, соціологія. 2 (25). CyberLeninka. 329.8:316.75(477). Such a party in its ideology defines the habit or tone of development for other participants of political process, and namely — some of them join the party and in their slogans and ideology they tend to find an excuse in the eyes of the electorate (as it was in different times with such parties as «Sil'nayaUkraina» headed by S. Tigipko, «Front Peremen» and «Narodniy Front» headed by A. Yatsenyuk); or the parties stand for diametrically opposite position, going to ultra rightist ideology spectrum (as in «Svoboda» or radical party headed by O. Lyashko)
    • Katchanovski, Ivan (15 December 2019). "The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine". Journal of Labor and Society. 23 (1): 5–29. doi:10.1111/wusa.12457. ISSN 2471-4607. S2CID 213672444. But the leader of the Radical Party, which combined far right populist elements and was involved in the formation of the Azov battalion along with neo-Nazi SNA, obtained 8% of the vote.
    • Kramer, Andrew E. (2017-10-26). "Bomb Wounds Ukrainian Politician as Assassination Plots Mount". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2025-02-01. The politician wounded on Wednesday, Ihor Mosiychuk, a populist member of Parliament with the far-right Radical Party, had just stepped out of a television studio after giving an interview; the explosives were set off as he exited the building. A political commentator, Vitaliy Bala, who had appeared with Mr. Mosiychuk in the interview, was also wounded.
    • Bila, Yuliya; Webb, Isaac (30 September 2014). "Ukraine Election Countdown: 26 Days Remaining". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2025-01-13. Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party was the second most popular party according to the Democratic Initiatives Foundation poll. Lyashko's emergence confounds earlier assessments that far-right nationalism had faded as an important political force.
    • Bond, Ian (27 November 2014). "Ukraine after the elections: Democracy and the barrel of a gun". Centre for European Reform. Retrieved 2025-01-13. So coalition talks include three smaller parties (including the far-right 'Radical Party', which argues for Ukraine to have nuclear weapons).
  14. ^
    • Rachok, Anatoliy (2015). Hanna Pashkova (ed.). "Party System of Ukraine Before and After Maidan: Changes, Trends, Public Demand" (PDF). National Security & Defence (6–7). Razumkov Centre: 15. "By the left/right vector, Parliament is dominated by parties of the right spectrum – Petro Poroshenko Bloc, "UDAR", "People's Front". "Opposition Bloc" with its paternalistic attitudes and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko can be qualified as leftist, given the rhetoric the parties resort to.
    • Chaisty, Paul; Whitefield, Stephen (2018). "Critical Election or Frozen Cleavages? How Voters Chose Parties in the 2014 Ukrainian Parliamentary Election". Electoral Studies. 56 (1): 162. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.009. Neither the emergence of a leftist populist party, the Radical Party, which sought to appeal to nationalist voters.
    • Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser; Paul Taggart; Paulina Ochoa Espejo; Pierre Ostiguy (26 October 2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford University Press. p. 291. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. ISBN 9780192525376. A feature of the post-Soviet landscape is that radical left-wing quasi-populist forces have been as prevalent (perhaps more so) than those of the right. This is unsurprising, since across Europe, the post-Soviet radical left has become more populist, acting no longer as the vanguard of a (now diminished) proletariat but as the vox populi (e.g. March, 2011). Whereas many left-wing parties retain a strong socialist ideological core, there are other social populists whose populism has become a more systematic element of their ideological appeal. Lyashko (who came third in the 2014 presidential elections) represents a less ideological, but more incendiary, macho, and media-astute populism akin to a "radio shock jock" (e.g. Kozloff, 2015). He supports a folksy, peasant-based populism focusing on anti-corruption and higher taxes on the oligarchs.
    • Zulianello, Mattia (2020). "Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries". Government and Opposition. 55 (2): 6. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.21. hdl:11368/3001222. ISSN 1477-7053.  -  Listed as "Left-wing/national-social".
    • Sychova, Viktoriia (2019). "Soviet archetype in interaction authorities fnd political opposition as threat to national security of Ukraine". Public Management. 18 (3): 454. doi:10.32689/2617-2224-2019-18-3-444-460. Thus, the representative of the left forces, the leader of the Radical Party Oleg Lyashko, positioning himself as a "people's" president, in essence, hinted at the establishment of an authoritarian regime: "Lyashko will be in Ukraine like Lukashenka in Belarus. Everyone will fly like a thorny broom".
    • Grigoryan, Arman (2020). "Selective Wilsonianism: Material Interests and the West's Support for Democracy". International Security. 44 (4): 171. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00378. There were others, such as Vadim Troyan, who was from Biletsky's Social-National Assembly and the Azov regiment, and who got elected in a single-mandate district, or Oleh Lyashko, whose ideology mixed left-wing populism with high-octane nationalism, and whose party—the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko—won 6.4 percent of the vote.
    • Oktysyuk, Anatoliy (27 November 2014). Vasyl Povoroznyk; Iaroslav Kovalchuk (eds.). "Shaky coalition of Democrats". Inside Ukraine. 39. Kyiv: International Centre for Policy Studies: 7. However, the left-wing ideology will be represented in parliament. "Batkivshchyna", the Opposition Bloc and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko have very pronounced centre-left platforms.
    • Bailo, Francesco (2016). Political stability and the fragmentation of online publics in multilingual states. Internet Policy & Politics Conference. Policy and Internet. Oxford Internet Institute. p. 26. Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko - Left-wing
  15. ^ "Lyashko: No sponsors, tycoons or deputies on election list of Radical Party". Kyiv Post. 8 August 2012. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  16. ^ "A strong vote for reform: Ukraine after the parliamentary elections". OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. 2014-10-29. Retrieved 2022-06-16.
  17. ^ "Party of Regions gets 185 seats in Ukrainian parliament, Batkivschyna 101 - CEC". Interfax-Ukraine. 12 November 2012. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  18. ^ Olena Goncharova; Ian Bateson (29 October 2014). "Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk's parties maneuver for lead role in coalition". Kyiv Post. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
    "New Verkhovna Rada". Kyiv Post. 30 October 2014. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  19. ^ "Poroshenko Bloc to have greatest number of seats in parliament". Ukrainian Television and Radio. 8 November 2014. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
    "People's Front 0.33% ahead of Poroshenko Bloc with all ballots counted in Ukraine elections - CEC". Interfax-Ukraine. 8 November 2014. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
    "Poroshenko Bloc to get 132 seats in parliament - CEC". Interfax-Ukraine. 8 November 2014. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  20. ^ CEC counts 100 percent of vote in Ukraine's parliamentary elections, Ukrinform (26 July 2019)
    (in Russian) Results of the extraordinary elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine 2019, Ukrayinska Pravda (21 July 2019)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia · View on Wikipedia

Developed by Nelliwinne