Social choice theory

Social choice theory is a branch of welfare economics that extends the theory of rational choice to collective decision-making.[1] Social choice studies the behavior of different mathematical procedures (social welfare functions) used to combine individual preferences into a coherent whole.[2][3][4] It contrasts with political science in that it is a normative field that studies how a society can make good decisions, whereas political science is a descriptive field that observes how societies actually do make decisions. While social choice began as a branch of economics and decision theory, it has since received substantial contributions from mathematics, philosophy, political science, and game theory.

Real-world examples of social choice rules include constitutions and parliamentary procedures for voting on laws, as well as electoral systems;[5] as such, the field is occasionally called voting theory.[5][6][7] It is closely related to mechanism design, which uses game theory to model social choice with imperfect information and self-interested citizens.

Social choice differs from decision theory in that the latter is concerned with how individuals, rather than societies, can make rational decisions.

  1. ^ Suzumura, Kotaro (1983). Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-12255-9.
  2. ^ For example, in Kenneth J. Arrow (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley, ch. II, section 2, A Notation for Preferences and Choice, and ch. III, "The Social Welfare Function".
  3. ^ Fishburn, Peter C. (1974). "Social Choice Functions". SIAM Review. 16: 63–90. doi:10.1137/1016005.
  4. ^ Amartya Sen (2008). "Social Choice". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract & TOC.
  5. ^ a b Zwicker, William S.; Moulin, Herve (2016), Brandt, Felix; Conitzer, Vincent; Endriss, Ulle; Lang, Jerome (eds.), "Introduction to the Theory of Voting", Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–56, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107446984.003, ISBN 978-1-107-44698-4, retrieved 2021-12-24
  6. ^ Nurmi, Hannu (2010), Rios Insua, David; French, Simon (eds.), "Voting Theory", e-Democracy: A Group Decision and Negotiation Perspective, Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 5, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 101–123, doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9045-4_7, ISBN 978-90-481-9045-4, retrieved 2024-06-20
  7. ^ Coughlin, Peter J. (1992-10-30). Probabilistic Voting Theory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-36052-4.

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