Competition law |
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Basic concepts |
Anti-competitive practices |
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Enforcement authorities and organizations |
A cartel is a group of independent market participants who collude with each other as well as agreeing not to compete with each other[1] in order to improve their profits and dominate the market. A cartel is an organization formed by producers to limit competition and increase prices by creating artificial shortages through low production quotas, stockpiling, and marketing quotas. Jurisdictions frequently consider cartelization to be anti-competitive behavior, leading them to outlaw cartel practices.
Cartels are inherently unstable due to the temptation by members of the cartel to cheat and defect on each other by improving their individual profits, which may lead to falling prices for all members.[2] The doctrine in economics that analyzes cartels is cartel theory. Cartels are distinguished from other forms of collusion or anti-competitive organization such as corporate mergers.[3]
Advancements in technology or the emergence of substitutes can undermine cartel pricing power, leading to the breakdown of the cooperation needed to sustain the cartel. Outside actors often respond to the undersupply of a good by bolstering their own production of the good, investing in technologies that use the good more efficiently, or by investing in substitutes.[4][5]
Examples of domestic cartels include the United States Gunpowder Trade Association (which was dissolved by U.S. courts in 1912) and the National Collegiate Athletic Association which restricts the kind of compensation that collegiate athletes can receive.[6][7][8] Examples of international cartels include the OPEC cartel to collude on oil production and the International Rubber Regulation Agreement to collude on rubber production.