| Strong Nash equilibrium | |
|---|---|
| Solution concept in game theory | |
| Relationship | |
| Subset of | Evolutionarily stable strategy (if the strong Nash equilibrium is not also weak) |
| Significance | |
| Used for | All non-cooperative games of more than 2 players |
In game theory, a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is a combination of actions of the different players, in which no coalition of players can cooperatively deviate in a way that strictly benefits all of its members, given that the actions of the other players remain fixed. This is in contrast to simple Nash equilibrium, which considers only deviations by individual players. The concept was introduced by Israel Aumann in 1959.[1] SNE is particularly useful in areas such as the study of voting systems, in which there are typically many more players than possible outcomes, and so plain Nash equilibria are far too abundant.[2]
- ^ R. Aumann (1959), Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games in "Contributions to the Theory of Games IV", Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J..
- ^ B. D. Bernheim; B. Peleg; M. D. Whinston (1987), "Coalition-Proof Equilibria I. Concepts", Journal of Economic Theory, 42: 1–12, doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8.